

I. Existing Application of Law & its judicial process vs judicial proceeding.

1. The presented record regarding a *defense motion* of the “UNITED STATES” to wit:

UNITED STATES’ MOTION TO DISMISS

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 41(b), the United States (incorrectly named here through the listing of the officials in their “official capacity” in the caption)¹ *requests that the Court dismiss with prejudice all counts and claims for relief in Plaintiff’s Complaint/“Petition.”*² The United States submits the attached memorandum in support of this motion. *Emphasis Added* & with the f.n. #1 & #2. See [ECF No. 12]

¹ A suit against an official of the federal government in the officer’s official capacity is treated as a suit against the United States, and thus the proper defendant is the United States. *See Coleman v. Espy*, 986 F.2d 1184, 1189 (8th Cir. 1993); *Hawaii v. Gordon*, 373 U.S. 57, 58 (1963)). Thus, because Plaintiff named as defendants Joseph R. Biden, Daniel Werfel, Janet Yellen, and Merrick B. Garland expressly “in [their] official capacity,” this suit should be treated as one against the United States. While naming individuals as defendants may be appropriate in a suit properly brought under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) or Religious Freedoms Restoration Act (“RFRA”), neither the APA or RFRA should apply in this case as discussed below in Part II.A.1. Even if either did, the naming of officials of the government as party defendants in their official capacities does not properly circumvent the doctrine of sovereign immunity as discussed in Part II.A.1. Similarly, if a suit is brought under 26 U.S.C. § 7422 against an officer of the United States, § 7422(f)(2) requires that the “pleadings be amended to substitute the United States as a party for such officer or employee.” Nevertheless, if the Court does consider this case as one properly brought against government officers such as (now former) President Biden and the other individually named defendants in their official capacities, they all are automatically substituted out since they are no longer with the government and have successors such as President Trump, Attorney General Bondi, etc. *See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d)*; *see, e.g., Aiken v. Dep’t of Justice*, 2017 WL 11884820, at *1 n.1 (S.D. Fla. 2017). Additionally, Hinds has asserted that there are actually *eight* defendants involved in the case, however the “Petition’s” caption, as well as the attached list for the civil cover sheet, identify only the four individuals listed above. (ECF No. 9 at 2, 12); (ECF No. 1 at 1); (ECF No. 1-27 at 2).

And

² Hinds takes issue with our description of ECF No. 1 as a “Complaint” rather than “Petition.” (ECF No. 9). However, FRCP Rule 3, states that a civil action is commenced by the filing of a “Complaint” and FCRP 7(a)(1) specifies that only a complaint is allowed.

2. Also, an attached “*responsive pleading*” [ECF No. 13] set forth, in part, as this:

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THE MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S

“PETITION” (Note: No caption title other than “JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR, *et al.*,” & [P/P])

Defendant United States (*incorrectly named here through the listing of the officials in their*

“official capacity” in the caption.) *respectfully moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s “Petition”*² (ECF

No. 1) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) Rule 41(b) and/or Rule 12(b)(1)

for lack of subject jurisdiction. For the reasons set forth below, **the Court should dismiss**

Hinds’s suit. *Emphasis Added* & with the f.n. #1 & #2. See [ECF No. 13]

¹ A suit against an official of the federal government in the officer’s official capacity is treated as a suit against the United States, and thus the proper defendant is the United States. *See Coleman v. Espy*, 986 F.2d 1184, 1189 (8th Cir. 1993); *Hawaii v. Gordon*, 373 U.S. 57, 58 (1963)). Thus, because Plaintiff named as defendants Joseph R. Biden, Daniel Werfel, Janet Yellen, and Merrick B. Garland expressly “in [their] official capacity,” this suit should be treated as one against the United States. While naming individuals as defendants may be appropriate in a suit properly brought under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) or Religious Freedoms Restoration Act (“RFRA”), neither the APA or RFRA should apply in this case as discussed below in Part II.A.1. Even if either did, the naming of officials of the government as party defendants in their official capacities does not properly circumvent the doctrine of sovereign immunity as discussed in Part II.A.1. Similarly, if a suit is brought under 26 U.S.C. § 7422 against an officer of the United States, § 7422(f)(2) requires that the “pleadings be amended to substitute the United States as a party for such officer or employee.” Nevertheless, if the Court does consider this case as one properly brought against government officers such as (now former) President Biden and the other individually named defendants in their official capacities, they all are automatically substituted out since they are no longer with the government and have successors such as President Trump, Attorney General Bondi, etc. *See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d)*; *see, e.g., Aiken v. Dep’t of Justice*, 2017 WL 11884820, at *1 n.1 (S.D. Fla. 2017). Additionally, Hinds has asserted that there are actually *eight* defendants involved in the case, however the “Petition’s” caption, as well as the attached list for the civil cover sheet, identify only the four individuals listed above. (ECF No. 9 at 2, 12); (ECF No. 1 at 1); (ECF No. 1-27 at 2).

² Hinds takes issue with our description of ECF No. 1 as a “Complaint” rather than “Petition.” (ECF No. 9). However, FRCP Rule 3, states that a civil action is commenced by the filing of a “Complaint” and FCRP 7(a)(1) specifies that only a complaint is allowed.

3. Legal matters of law with Presented Question of Law concerning *assignment of error*:

A. Judicial Proceeding:

Specific event: A particular instance within the judicial process, such as a trial, hearing, or other formal legal action. Focuses on: A *specific legal matter* or action within a court or a petition tribunal.

a). Injury vs Damage: ([P/P]'s *suit of equity* concerns, in part ***injury*** not monetary ***damage***)

b). ***Motion to Dismiss*** [ECF No. 12] vs or should have been made as ***Motion to Strike*** under Rule 12(f) pursuant to Rule 12 (6) *failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted*. [ECF No. 12] attacks as a requests that the Court *dismiss with prejudice* all counts and claims for relief in Plaintiff's Complaint/"Petition." *Emphasis added*.

c). ***A lack of subject matter jurisdiction*** under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) vs ***a lack of a required consent & its waver*** under a ***federal common law*** of Federal Sovereign Immunity Doctrine ("[F/S/I/D]"). [P/P] has maintained [F/S/I/D] is a *religious dogma* from Church of England, being violent of [P/P]'s FAITH in [LAW] and U.S. Constitution & ***Establishment Clause***. [F/S/I/D] provides no legal right(s), or legal remedies are inadequate under Rule of Law.

B. Judicial Process:

Broader concept: Refers to the entire system of courts, procedures, and legal principles used to resolve disputes and enforce laws. Includes: All stages of a legal case, from initial filing to final judgment, including trials, appeals, and other legal actions.

a). **Lawsuit vs. Suit of Equity** (A Difference in Focus and Remedies)

Lawsuit vs. Suit of Equity: *A Difference in Focus and Remedies*

In legal terms, both a "lawsuit" and a "suit of equity" refer to legal actions brought in a court of law. Subsequently they traditionally differed in their focus in law & the types of remedies they could offer.

1. Lawsuit:

- A lawsuit, also referred to as a "legal claim," generally focuses on legal rights and obligations that are defined by codified rules and statutes.
- When a legal right is violated, the primary remedy sought in a lawsuit is monetary compensation, or damages.
- Examples include recovering monetary damages for breach of contract or negligence.

2. Suit of Equity:

- A suit of equity, also known as an "action in equity," centers on principle of fairness and justice to address situations where the strict application of the law would lead to an unfair outcome.
- The remedies provided in a suit of equity are non-monetary, aiming to ensure a just and fair solution.
- Examples of equitable remedies include:
 - Injunctions: A court order requiring a party to do or refrain from doing a specific act.
 - Specific performance: A court order compelling a party to fulfill their contractual obligations.
 - Declaratory judgments: A court declaration of the legal rights, liability, duties and obligations of parties.
 - Rescission: Canceling a contract or repeal of a doctrine, vacate an order.
 - Rectification: correcting common errors in legal document writing.

Historical context:

- Historically, in England, there were separate courts for "law" and "equity".

- Law courts focused on applying strict legal rules and granting monetary remedies.
- Equity courts, like the Court of Chancery, provided remedies based on fairness and conscience when common law was deemed too rigid.

Modern Practice:

- Today, most jurisdictions, including the U.S. federal courts and most state courts, have merged law and equity into a single court system.
- This means that a single court can now grant both legal and equitable remedies.
- However, the underlying principles and distinctions between legal and equitable remedies still exist and determine the availability of a jury trial (generally available in legal cases, but not in equitable ones) and the types of defenses applicable.

In essence, the *procedural distinction* between *lawsuits* and *suits of equity* has major differences in the focus of law and of equity or how facts are presented into the record with remedies & reliefs sought in this hybrid/constitutional case presented before this Court & within its *jurisdiction* and *authority*... *only* the Courts can provide.

Courts, in a legal context, can provide *interpretations of laws*, *resolve disputes*, and *create new law through judicial precedent*. They ensure the *application of laws*, uphold *constitutional rights*, and *help maintain social order*. [P/P]'s FAITH in [LAW] (a *dogma*).
b). Plaintiff vs Petitioner or as plead Real Party in Interest as Plaintiff/Petitioner, (“[P/P]”). [P/P]'s Petition [ECF No. 1] *vs* at first or as an *instant motion* proffered as PLAINTIFF'S “COMPLAINT” [ECF No. 6] without a due process or notice. But then abruptly without the *function of legal precedent* or turbulently amended as Plaintiff's Complaint/“Petition”; [ECF No. 12] *only* to be proffered or presented as PLAINTIFF'S “PETITION” [ECF No.

13] or *as now written* within [ECF No. 31]: “*The United States moved to dismiss Plaintiff Terry Lee Hinds’s Petition*” or “*the Court should dismiss Hinds’s suit.*” (*Inter alia*).

Overwhelmingly, in this "Apocalyptic" Legal Landscape & as used to describe U.S. *defense counsels* human-driven threats against the *concepts* of “***Equality before the law***” and “***Equal justice under law***” as a phrase engraved on the West Pediment, above the front entrance of the United States Supreme Court building in Washington D.C. vs a policy and legal practice [To LIVE as EVIL]. [To LIVE as EVIL] *vs our constitution*, a *deify policy*, practice & purpose to deny, defeat & defend or destroy these ***two dynamic sacred pillars*** as the *establishment/free exercise thereof* for equitable relief & remedies under a “Petition” presented as a biblical revelation within “federal equity in law”. In short, FAITH in [LAW].

Current legal framework, applications of law and its jurisdiction

c). [P/P]’s FAITH in [LAW] *vs the defenses of [F/S/I/D]* and it required consent and “To the contrary, the suit is specifically precluded by the Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a), and/or the tax exception to the Declaratory Judgment Act, 26 U.S.C. § 2201(a), because Hinds seeks to restrain the assessment and collection of taxes. Thus, the Court should dismiss his Petition under Rule 12(b)(1).” See [ECF No. 31].

- 1). The Court is well aware that “UNITED STATES” has filed a pretrial *motion to dismiss* [ECF No. 12] being pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 12(b)(1) (“lack of subject-matter jurisdiction”) and Rule 41(b) (“Involuntary Dismissal; Effect”).
- 2). Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) concerns ***subject matter jurisdiction & a lack thereof***, thus *legal standards* & its process is critical to *procedural due process & substantive due process/rights/grounds* for [P/P]’s case & claims within [PPP].
- 3). In essence, [P/P]’s presents this *application of law* & its judicial process as a roadmap

for navigating the legal system in this case, while [ECF Nos. 12-13] is of a judicial proceeding as a specific step or event on that roadmap.

Another United States' procedural errors about getting the process wrong:

- 4). Defendants' failed to plead or invoke Fed. R. Civ. P., Rule 12(f) Motion to Strike (The court may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter) **when** UNITED STATES' MOTION TO DISMISS re: [ECF No. 12] "*requests that the Court dismiss with prejudice all counts and claims for relief in Plaintiff's **Complaint**/**Petition**'.*" A legal defect in a pleading and invites *plain error*, if the Court would grant this pending motion.
- 5). The Court is aware, likewise self-evident that Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) does not **mention or authorized** Federal Sovereign Immunity Doctrine ("[F/S/I/D]") as (unequivocally expressed in statutory text as waiver & a consent to sue). [F/S/I/D] is *a federal common law judicial doctrine* from the Federal Courts system.
- 6). Federal common law is a limited body of judicially created rules that federal courts use when a controlling federal statute doesn't exist. **However**, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) is a federal statute for a "*lack of subject matter jurisdiction*" thus [F/S/I/D] is a moot issue.
- 7). The Court is aware, likewise self-evident what is "***federal subject matter jurisdiction***" and thereby what constitutes a "***lack of subject matter jurisdiction***" as defined within the Judicial Powers & Authority – by Article III, sec.2, cl.1, in part, to wit:

"The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States..." and "to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party". (No exceptions written herein such as [F/S/I/D].)
- 8). Judicial doctrines or court rules or procedures, like *stare decisis* (following precedent), are interpretations of the law **and are not equal** to the U. S. Constitution. No court's

doctrine, even from the Supreme Court does not supersede the U.S. Constitution. The Constitution, and federal laws made pursuant to it, are the "supreme Law of the Land," as stated in the Supremacy Clause (Article VI, Clause 2). This means that the U. S. Constitution and federal law take precedence over state laws and constitutions, and that state courts, including all federal courts are bound by them.

- 9). [P/P]’s maintains as a *matter of law & its due process*; before the **legal controversy** of [F/S/I/D] can be employed as a **medieval doctrine** of a *common law* from the **Church of England**, emerging in the context of the Divine Right of Kings, where “The King Can Do No Wrong”; [P/P]’s respectfully requests for these cited case law decisions of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeal’s **legal standards** be invoked or reviewed:

Question Presented:

Whether the district Court can grant an adversary party’s defense’s claim of a **“lack of subject matter jurisdiction”** under FRCP, Rule 12(b)(1); when [P/P]’s *constitutional case*, as a “petition” presented as a **suit of equity** for grievances & reliefs sought through **the free exercise clause** right of [P/P/P] whereby this *civil action* existing as **a certain class of case**.

I. Case law that constitutes a “lack of subject matter jurisdiction” under Rule 12(b)(1).

- a). “In order to **properly dismiss** for *lack of subject matter jurisdiction* under Rule 12(b)(1), **the complaint** must be successfully challenged on its face or on the factual truthfulness of its averments.” *Titus v. Sullivan*, 4 F.3d 590, 593 (8th Cir. 1993) (*Osborn v. United States*, 918 F.2d 724, 729 n.6 (8th Cir. 1990)). **Emphasis Added.**
- b). On a motion to dismiss for *lack of subject matter jurisdiction* under Rule 12(b)(1), courts must “consider whether a party is asserting a ‘facial attack’ or a ‘factual attack’ on jurisdiction.” (citing *Carlsen v. GameStop, Inc.*, 833 F.3d 903, 908 (8th Cir. 2016).”

- c). A facial challenge requires the court to “determine whether the asserted jurisdictional basis is patently meritless by looking to the face of the complaint ... and drawing all reasonable inferences in *favor of the plaintiff*.” *Biscanin v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc.*, 407 F.3d 905, 907 (8th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). *Emphasis Added*.
- d). “In a facial challenge to jurisdiction, the court presumes all of the factual allegations concerning jurisdiction to be true and will grant the motion only if the *plaintiff fails* to allege an element necessary for *subject matter jurisdiction*.” *Young Am. Corp. v. Affiliated Comput. Servs.*, 424 F.3d 840, 843-44 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing *Titus*, 4 F.3d at 593). *Emphasis Added*.
- e). In a factual challenge to jurisdiction, “there is substantial authority that the trial court is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case.” *Osborn*, 918 F.2d at 730.
- f). In short, no presumptive truthfulness attaches to *plaintiff’s* allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims.” *Iowa League of Cities v. EPA*, 711 F.3d 844, 861 (8th Cir. 2013) (citing *Osborn*, 918 F.2d 724, 730). *Emphasis Added*.
- g). The *plaintiff has the burden* of proving jurisdiction exists. *Kennedy Bldg. Assocs. v. Viacom, Inc.*, 375 F.3d 731, 745 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing *Cty. of Los Angeles v. Davis*, 440 U.S. 625, 631, 99 S.Ct. 1379, 59 L.Ed.2d 642 (1979)). *Emphasis Added*.
- h). Once the ***evidence is submitted***, the district court must ***decide the jurisdictional issue***, not simply rule that there is or is not enough evidence to have a trial on the issue.” *Osborn*, 918 F.2d at 730. ***Emphasis Added***. (*evidence submitted is a due process issue*)
- i). “Jurisdictional issues, whether they involve questions of law or of fact, are for the court

to decide.” *Id.* at 729. “Moreover, because jurisdiction is a threshold question, judicial economy demands that the issue be decided at the outset rather than deferring it until trial, as would occur with denial of a summary judgment motion.” *Id.*

- j). In “a factual attack on the *jurisdictional allegations of the complaint*, the court may receive competent evidence such as affidavits, deposition testimony, and the like in order to determine the factual dispute.” *Id.* In a factual challenge, “no presumptive truthfulness attaches to the *plaintiff’s allegations*, and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims. Moreover, the *plaintiff will have the burden of proof* that jurisdiction does in fact exist.” *Id.* at 729 (citation omitted). ***Emphasis Added.***

II. Case law that constitutes “subject matter jurisdiction”

- a). ***Subject matter jurisdiction*** refers to a **court’s power to decide a certain class of cases.**

LeMay v. U.S. Postal Serv., 450 F.3d 797, 799 (8th Cir. 2006). ***Emphasis Added.***

- b). “Federal courts are not courts of general jurisdiction; they have only the power that is authorized by Article III of the Constitution and the statutes enacted by Congress pursuant thereto.” *Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist.*, 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986). *See also Gunn v. Minton*, 568 U.S. 251, 256 (2013) (“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, ***possessing only that power authorized by Constitution and statute***”). ***Emphasis Added.***

- c). The presence of *subject matter jurisdiction* is a threshold requirement that must be assured in every federal case. *Kronholm v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.*, 915 F.2d 1171, 1174 (8th Cir. 1990). *See also Sanders v. Clemco Indus.*, 823 F.2d 214, 216 (8th Cir. 1987) (“The threshold requirement in every federal case is jurisdiction and we have

admonished the district court to be attentive to a satisfaction of jurisdictional requirements in all cases”).

- d). As such, the issue of *subject matter jurisdiction* may be raised at any time, by any party or the court. *Gray v. City of Valley Park, Mo.*, 567 F.3d 976, 982 (8th Cir. 2009).
- e) Federal courts have *subject matter jurisdiction* over both ***federal question cases*** and diversity of citizenship cases. *See Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Tribal Court of Spirit Lake Indian Reservation*, 495 F.3d 1017, 1020 (8th Cir. 2007) (finding that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking if neither diversity of citizenship nor federal question jurisdiction applies); *McLaurin v. Prater*, 30 F.3d 982, 984-85 (8th Cir. 1994) (noting that Congress has directed that district courts shall have jurisdiction in both federal question and diversity cases). The burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction belongs to ***the plaintiff***. *V S Ltd. P'ship v. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev.*, 235 F.3d 1109, 1112 (8th Cir. 2000). ***Emphasis Added.***

III. Case law that constitutes “federal question jurisdiction”

- a). *Federal question jurisdiction* gives district courts “original jurisdiction over civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” *Griffioen v. Cedar Rapids & Iowa City Ry. Co.*, 785 F.3d 1182, 1188 (8th Cir. 2015). *See also* 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
- b). Whether a claim arises under federal law is determined by reference to the “well-pleaded complaint.” *Great Lakes Gas Transmission Ltd. P'ship v. Essar Steel Minn. LLC*, 843 F.3d 325, 329 (8th Cir. 2016).
- c). The *well-pleaded complaint* rule provides that jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of a ***plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint***. *Markham*

v. Wertin, 861 F.3d 748, 754 (8th Cir. 2017). *See also Thomas v. United Steelworkers Local 1938*, 743 F.3d 1134, 1139 (8th Cir. 2014) (“Under the ***well-pleaded complaint*** rule, a federal question must exist on the face of the ***plaintiff’s properly pleaded*** complaint in order to ***establish federal question subject matter jurisdiction***”).

Emphasis Added.

d). ***Plaintiff’s complaint*** must establish “either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the *plaintiff’s right* to relief necessarily depends on the resolution of a substantial question of federal law.” *Williams v. Ragnone*, 147 F.3d 700, 702 (8th Cir. 1998). *See also Northwest South Dakota Production Credit Ass’n v. Smith*, 784 F.2d 323, 325 (8th Cir. 1986) (stating that “[a] non-frivolous claim of a right or remedy under a federal statute is sufficient to invoke federal question jurisdiction”). “If the asserted basis of federal jurisdiction is patently meritless, then dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is appropriate.” *Biscanin v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc.*, 407 F.3d 905, 907 (8th Cir. 2005).

Emphasis Added.

IV. Case law that constitutes “Federal Government Sovereign Immunity”

a). “Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit.” *FDIC v. Meyer*, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994). “Sovereign immunity is jurisdictional in nature. Indeed, the terms of [the United States’] consent to be sued in any court define that court’s jurisdiction to entertain the suit.” *Id.* (citation omitted). “A waiver of the Federal Government’s sovereign immunity must be unequivocally expressed in statutory text and will not be implied.” *Lane v. Pena*, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996) (citation omitted). “To sue the United States, **[the plaintiff]** must show both a waiver of sovereign immunity and a grant of subject matter jurisdiction.” *VS Ltd. P’ship v. Dept. of Housing &*

Urban Dev., 235 F.3d 1109, 1112 (8th Cir. 2000). If sovereign immunity applies, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, and the matter must be dismissed without prejudice. *Roth v. United States*, 476 F. App'x 95, 95 (8th Cir. 2012).

b). Likewise, any claim against President Donald J. Trump in his official capacity is a claim against the United States. *Coleman v. Espy*, 986 F.2d 1184, 1189 (8th Cir. 1993). “Sovereign immunity bars claims against federal officials in their official capacity unless a waiver is unequivocally expressed by Congress.” *Id.* With respect to *constitutional tort claims for damages* brought against the United States or its agencies, Congress has not waived sovereign immunity. *F.D.I.C. v. Meyer*, 510 U.S. 471 (1994). Thus, **Plaintiff** cannot **recover** against the United States on his claims because the federal government and its agencies are immune from any such suit. *Laswell v. Brown*, 683 F.2d 261, 268 (8th Cir. 1982) (“Bivens and its progeny do not waive sovereign immunity for actions against the United States; it implies a cause of action only against federal officials.”). **Emphasis Added. “claims for damages”**.

c). A *suit against an official of the federal government in the officer’s official capacity* is treated as a *suit against the United States*, and thus the **proper defendant** is the United States. See *Coleman v. Espy*, 986 F.2d 1184, 1189 (8th Cir. 1993); *Hawaii v. Gordon*, 373 U.S. 57, 58 (1963). See f.n. [ECF Nos. 12-13]. **NOTE:** [P/P]’s “Petition” [ECF No. 1] as well as all of his pleading **did not choose** “UNITED STATES” as a **“defendant”**. Rather hoping our U.S. military’s wisdom and knowledge of (60 years) about *my officially status* with the “UNITED STATES”; existing as an **unknown quantity of a supernatural realm would prevent our government** on Earth, existing as a **“defendant” vs “Interested Party”**. The Court cannot review the private information provided in a vital letter, dated Tuesday

February 4, 2025, when Bondi became the leadership of the Office of the Attorney General, *with the authority to change certain matters entrusted* with the DOJ & its **10,000 plus** attorneys charged with ensuring *“that the laws be faithfully executed.” Emphasis Added.*

CONCLUSION

In the evolution of law as a hybrid case, & [P/P]’s lawful/legal status with this Court, has presented a complex situation with multiple legal interpretations and potential arguments. I Am of the belief that *“a house divided against itself cannot stand”* as this government cannot endure permanently, being split by court decisions or deeply divided by *religious liberty* as [FAITH in [LAW] vs being enslaved or burdened by law as [To LIVE as EVIL].

Signatures of

Dated the 4th day of June 2025

 /s/ Terry Lee Hinds
TERRY LEE HINDS
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND DELIVERY

I hereby certify that the foregoing was filed on this 4th day of June 2025 with the court, with a true and correct copy, served upon [D/R/I P] through their counsel for the defense, by First Class U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, at the following address and named attorney:

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